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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses primary concepts in the humanitarian intervention debates. I argue that 
humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty. The global community has a moral obligation to act 
decisively in the face of extreme human rights abuses. There are two contrasting theoretical 
perspectives regarding international relations and humanitarian intervention: statism and 
cosmopolitanism. These contrasting perspectives contest the relative value of state sovereignty 
and human rights. Some of the most prominent ethicists in the debate have determined states 
have a “right” to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states to halt severe human 
rights abuses but there is no “duty” to intervene. These conclusions are largely based upon 
consequentialist considerations. This thesis argues a deontological perspective is essential. 
References to events Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo are made. There is a critical role for 
preemptive actions to play in addressing humanitarian crises and calls for global justice.  
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Introduction 
     Approximately 40 million people were killed in wars between states while more than four 
times that number, some 170 million people, were killed by their own governments in the 20
th
 
century.
1
  In addition to repressive governments, the lack of a functioning state government with 
authority over its entire territory can foster humanitarian crises. With many states incapable of 
carrying out their responsibility to protect lives and maintain public order, the scourge of mass 
murder, ethnic cleansing and genocide continues accompanied by rampant disease and 
starvation. Some human rights abuses can only be averted or halted by military force. While all 
reasonable religious and ethical theories converge in the judgment that severe human rights 
abuses are morally unacceptable, there is no convergence regarding morally acceptable responses 
to such atrocities.
2
  The morality of military intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state, 
on the one hand, has to be examined against the moral permissibility of not acting to protect 
innocent lives from systematic human rights abuses, on the other. How are morally authoritative 
guidelines for determining when to act established and justified?      
       Deliberations regarding humanitarian intervention encompass a range of contentious moral, 
political and legal concepts. This essay examines some of the contemporary moral concepts 
employed in deliberations regarding humanitarian intervention. The salient themes in the debate 
are essentially moral in nature and I generally shall put the political and legal considerations 
aside in this essay.
3
  The justification of humanitarian intervention should rest upon moral 
reasoning rather than international law. Moral reasoning has the potential to guide us in a more 
                                                 
1
 Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, “The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention in 
Darfur”, Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2, (2006): 144.  
2
 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. 3rd ed. (2005): 48. 
3
 Ibid., 8. 
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just and comprehensive manner. Laws and political traditions are bound to reflect communally 
established practices based upon prudential considerations. Moral reasoning can help us 
determine what ought to be done for sake of global justice. Legislative bodies will often prescribe 
what will be done based upon the unjust inclinations of its most powerful members. The 
deficiencies of the United Nations Security Council as a source of just international law make the 
need for alternative sources of authoritative international norms evident. Customs and 
agreements based upon international power structures should not take priority over sound moral 
reasoning.
4
  
     In general, conclusions regarding what is morally acceptable are guided by the relative 
priority assigned to contrasting philosophical concepts. Broadly speaking, a deontological focus, 
for example, emphasizes what actions we ought to take based upon principles that guide agents in 
determining what choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In contrast, a 
consequentialist perspective will assess the morality of actions based upon the value of the state 
of affairs (or outcome) they bring about relative to what has been determined to be the overall 
“Good”.
5
 The Kantian deontological principle of humanity as an end-in-itself is central to this 
thesis.           
    This essay contends there are sound philosophical reasons to view humanitarian intervention 
as a moral obligation in certain cases. Initiating military actions to halt human rights violations is 
the essence of humanitarian intervention. The moral worth of humanitarian intervention rests 
upon the supreme principle of humanity as an end-in-itself. In fact, humanitarian intervention is a 
perfect duty in that the empirical circumstances themselves surrounding human rights crises 
                                                 
4
 Aidan Hehir in Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, 2nd ed., notes the distinction, (2013): 112.   
5
 Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2015 
Edition: 1.                     
10 
 
generally dictate what actions must be taken, when the action must be taken and who must take 
the life-saving actions.
6
 Human rights obligations are universal. At the same time, only a limited 
number of states possess the military assets needed to rescue victims of extreme abuse.  
     This essay establishes the case for humanitarian intervention as a moral obligation by 
considering critical aspects of several topics related to human rights and global justice in the 21
st
 
century. They include: (1) the nature of duty and moral obligations, (2) human rights and moral 
obligations, (3) armed humanitarian intervention, (4) statist and cosmopolitan conceptions of 
global order and duty, (5) global justice and moral obligations, (6) the role of preemption in the 
duty to protect and rescue, and (7) objections to humanitarian intervention. The general nature of 
this essay rests upon narrowing the nature of human rights violations that necessitate 
humanitarian intervention while at the same time making a case for decisive early actions when 
abuses are imminent. While there are a wide range of opinions regarding the scope and nature of 
human rights, I advocate humanitarian intervention only in cases involving a narrow class of 
human rights violations which we reviewed later.      
     The essay will explore the value of preemption as a moral response to the threat of severe 
human rights abuses. In expounding upon the related topics I hope to address essential elements 
of a deontological approach to humanitarian intervention. In constructing an effective future 
approach to humanitarian intervention the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) notes the necessity of meeting several basic objectives.
7
 They include the 
establishment of the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary, and the establishment of 
                                                 
6
 Violetta Igneski, “Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Aid”, Social Theory and Practice, (July 2006: 444).  
7
 The ICISS was established by the government of Canada and published its report, “The Responsibility to Protect”, 
in December 2001: 11.   
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clearer rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and how to intervene. How 
are we to determine our moral duties regarding humanitarian crises?     
  
Chapter 1: Duty and Moral Obligations 
     We turn now to a consideration of the critical role of the concept of duty in deontological 
ethics. Drawing distinctions between the nature of perfect and imperfect duties is important. In 
order for society to exist at all, some basic moral requirements or laws of civil society must be 
observed. In contrast, observing other social practices only contribute to “an improved 
existence”. 
8
  Perfect rights and duties are viewed as taking their identity from the first kind of 
obligation: the imperfect from the second. Imperfect duties maybe considered duties linked to 
adopting ends. One could, for example, make a general commitment to beneficence and aiding 
the needy. The structure of this imperfect duty gives the agent latitude regarding who to help, 
how to help and when to help. The obligations of an imperfect duty are generally not dictated by 
emergency circumstances. The agent is not bound to fulfill this duty in any particular way or at 
any particular time.
9
 The time, place, object and nature of the actions required come into play in 
considering whether an obligation is a perfect or imperfect duty.   
     The fact that one has latitude in fulfilling an imperfect duty gives the agent a range of options 
in choosing who to help, how to help, and when to help.
10
 In contrast, a duty is perfect when one 
has an obligation to perform a particular task at a specific time. In sum, a perfect obligation binds 
one to do a specific thing, while an imperfect obligation may commit one to a general orientation 
                                                 
8
 J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, (1998):133. 
9
 Violetta Igneski, “Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Aid”, Social Theory and Practice, (July 2006: 440). 
10
 George Rainbolt, “Perfect and Imperfect Obligations”, Philosophical Studies (2000): 243.    
12 
 
of charity and beneficence, for example, giving one the latitude to fulfill the obligation in a 
number of different ways. Igneski argues it is the “moral determinacy” of situations that accounts 
for this difference between the two.
11
 In general, morally determinant circumstances are 
characterized by an imminent danger requiring specific actions to avert a tragic outcome. 
Accordingly, a perfect duty obliges an agent to do (or refrain from doing) a particular act and it 
is determinate in terms of who must carry it out and when it must be done.      
     Humanitarian crises are “morally determinant”, and humanitarian intervention is as an 
appropriate response to these human tragedies.
12
 Definitive actions, not long-range strategic 
calculations, are required. Specifically, there are two conditions that make a situation morally 
determinant.
13
 A morally determinant situation specifies when the agent must act. In most cases 
the specific time is now.
14
 The response is required immediately. And the situation itself dictates 
what must be done to resolve the problem.
15
 From the agent’s perspective, a specific act is 
required, if the moral obligation is to be fulfilled. Acting in a timely manner in specific ways is 
required to save victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide, for example. The general 
circumstances themselves determine what must be done. When civilians are being systematically 
killed by state-supported military forces, or armed gangs beyond the control of the states, the 
only way to halt the carnage is counter military measures. These are circumstances in which 
many lives will be lost if only non-military initiatives are pursued. Appeals to reason and 
diplomatic initiatives alone will not stop those bent on ethnic cleaning and genocide. If actions 
are not taken immediately lives will be lost. For these reasons humanitarian crises typically 
                                                 
11
 Violetta Igneski, “Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Aid”, 440.  
12
 Ibid., 446. 
13
 Ibid., 448. 
14
 Ibid., 449. 
15
 Ibid., 448. 
13 
 
prompt circumstances entailing perfect duties to rescue. The imminent threat of mass murder and 
genocide creates morally determinant circumstances. A morally determinant situation will, in 
and of itself, circumscribe particular actions, who must take the actions, and when (or by when) 
the actions must be taken in order to fulfill a moral obligation.  
     To a large extent clarifying the moral imperative of employing military actions to rescue 
victims of human rights abuses requires us to specify the nature of human rights and exactly 
what humanitarian intervention does and does not entail. We start first with the concept of 
human rights then consider details regarding what humanitarian intervention entails. This should 
help us clarify how morally authoritative trip-lines for determining when to act are established 
and justified? The nature and justification of human rights is also contentious. Yet a claim that 
humanitarian intervention is a moral obligation based upon duties to protect human rights 
requires us to specify how basic human rights are conceived in this essay. Ideally, the overall 
expectation is the establishment of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate component within a 
framework of universal moral norms. The existing human rights treaties and conventions have 
provided a contextual platform for addressing global moral norms regarding human dignity and 
the sanctity of human life. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider human rights here.    
 
Chapter 2: Human Rights and Moral Obligations 
     Human rights have a high moral priority. Interest-based justifications and agency-based 
justifications offer critical considerations. Securing the basic interest and needs of human beings 
is a primary consideration. The process of identifying and justifying basic human interests and 
needs is itself considerably engrossing. Nevertheless, human rights should secure minimal 
14 
 
standards that make it possible for human beings to pursue a life plan and social arrangements 
they choose without coercive directives. The universal nature of human rights, respect for human 
beings as rational agents, and the legitimate claims of right holders are important considerations 
in the humanitarian intervention debate.   
     The universal nature of human rights is critical to humanitarian intervention. A brief 
examination of the nature of rights as they relate to claims is examined. Finally, it is noted while 
individuals may have morally imperatival claims on others, we do not necessarily consider all 
morally legitimate claims to be human rights. However, morally legitimate claims, when placed 
in context, are directly related to the duty of humanitarian intervention. I address this in greater 
detail later.  
     Broadly speaking, human rights are primarily universal moral norms that bind all people in all 
places at all times: they exist independently of legal and political recognition, and human beings 
have them simply because they are human beings.
16
 They are the rights of all human beings. 
Gordon notes Locke’s contention that “human beings possess natural rights, independently of the 
political recognition granted them by the state”.
17
 Essentially, these natural rights are possessed 
independently of and prior to the formation of any political community. Being human, not 
political declarations and treaties, is the critical consideration in defining human rights. The 
moral significance of human rights and human-rights violations does not vary with whose human 
rights are at stake; as far as human rights are concerned, all human beings matter equally.   
                                                 
16
 John-Stewart Gordon, “On Justifying Human Rights”, in Boylan’s The Morality and Global Justice Reader, (2011):28.  
17
 Ibid., 31. 
15 
 
   Human rights have an “independent existence”.
18
 People have human rights independently of 
whether they are found in the practices, mores, or the laws of their country or culture. A human 
right is a genuinely universal moral right. Human rights do not depend in any way on the status 
of the individual. They are rights that pertain to human beings merely because they are human 
beings.  
     Human rights are sustainable and justified as inherently valuable, “always and everywhere”, 
largely because human beings are naturally goal creating, purposive, and evaluative beings.
19
 I 
am in agreement with the perspective that human rights are best understood and justified with 
regards to a moral obligation to protect human agency or autonomy. A critical aspect of Western 
human rights is their existence as moral rights of individuals to make autonomous decisions 
regarding their lives. Boylan notes the imperative of all people having the ability and opportunity 
to make decisions regarding “the essential core commonly held values: ethics, aesthetics and 
religion.”
20
 The agent-based perspective of human rights is directly linked to the natural ability 
of humans to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life. Having the autonomy to 
act upon one’s essential core values is essential. Accordingly, the justifying generic function that 
Griffin assigns to human rights is protecting individual agency which includes three components: 
autonomy, freedom, and a minimal well-being.
21
 From my perspective, establishing human 
rights based upon the natural capacities of individuals highlights their universal nature. Yet, what 
matters most in the end is a consensus regarding human dignity and the sanctity of human life.   
                                                 
18
 James Nickel, “Human Rights” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2013): 3.  
19
 Robert Churchill, “Global Human Rights”, in Boylan’s The Morality and Global Justice Reader, (2011):20.  
 
20
 Michael Boylan, Morality and Global Justice: Justifications and Applications, (2011): 24. 
21
 James Nickels, “Human Rights”, 9. 
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     The various ways in which individuals and institutions bear correlative duties is a critical 
aspect of human rights. Consideration must be given to the relationship between rights and 
duties. Human rights are unequivocally justified when a definite claim can be established against 
a specific agent. Given the expansive nature of the human rights debate, I find the concept of 
having duty-bearers corresponding to right-holders is essential. The various ways in which 
individuals and institutions bear correlative duties is a decisive aspect of human rights. If it is 
established, for example, that there is a “right” to an education, then it is the case that this right 
imposes a corresponding duty on others to provide an education. “Human rights are rights of all 
individuals against all individuals: To say that all men have a right to life is to impose on all men 
the duty of respecting human life.”
22
 This perspective gives focus to individual human beings, 
not the state, as the ultimate source of morality and the ultimate units of moral concern. Human 
rights are essentially the rights of everyone imposing a duty upon everyone.  
     What the specific content of the counterpart obligation is and who specifically has that 
obligation are critical aspects of human rights. I am inclined to agree, there are no substantive 
rights without specific obligations on the part of second parties. Where these things (correlative 
claims and obligations) are lacking we don’t have a proper right.
23
  Human rights are “doubly 
universal” in the sense that all human beings are protected by human rights and, at the same 
time, they also hold corresponding duties to others with the same rights.
24
    
       Human rights conceived from this perspective reference a “narrow definition”, not 
including all of the privileges delineated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the constitutions of liberal Western states. Reference is being made to a “special class of urgent 
                                                 
22
 Rex Martin, “Are Human Right Universal”, in Patrick Hayden’s (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights, (2001): 62.  
23
 Ibid., 65. 
24
 John-Stewart Gordon “On Justifying Human Rights”: 30. 
17 
 
rights” prohibiting mass murder and genocide.
25
  The violation of this class of rights is 
universally condemned. Humanitarian intervention should proceed with the objective of securing 
the right to physical integrity and unwarranted bodily harm, without interfering with the ongoing 
social, economic, and political arrangements of communities. At the same time, positive rights 
and duties are also essential as we shall see.   
     Advancing the concept of humanitarian intervention requires at least a minimal consensus on 
human rights. The existence of a basic consensus, or a lack thereof, plays a critical role in the 
nature of international responses to human rights abuses. However, narrowing the scope of 
human rights does not, by any means, narrow the scope of legitimate moral obligations. The duty 
of humanitarian intervention, I will argue, involves moral obligations that lay beyond those 
based upon human rights. Human rights are an essential component, but not the only 
consideration. We discuss critical aspects of moral obligations based upon global justice later.   
 
Chapter 3: Armed Humanitarian Intervention 
     In this essay humanitarian intervention is viewed as military action of one state, a group of 
states, or an international organization aimed at a prevention or interruption of life threatening 
conflicts in another state. The purpose is to stop significant and specific human rights violations. 
The world has an obligation to prevent widespread human suffering resulting from mass murder, 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. Human lives can be put at risk not only by external aggression, 
but also by circumstances within a country over which the government has little or no control. It 
is only when national systems of justice either cannot or will not act to deter or halt large scale 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 79. 
18 
 
crimes against humanity that universal jurisdiction and other international obligations should 
come into play.   
     Humanitarian intervention has different objectives than both traditional war-fighting and 
traditional peacekeeping operations.
26
 It is important to note how humanitarian interventions are 
distinguished from other types of military enforcement action and traditional peacekeeping. The 
goal is to protect populations and not to defeat or destroy an enemy militarily. In contrast to UN-
sanctioned cases of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping operations are authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter – rather than Chapter VII, which allows for the 
“use of all necessary means” to restore international peace and security, including military 
force.
27
 The justification of military force as an option is supported by the knowledge that in 
some circumstances only military force can accomplish the job of protecting victims of human 
rights abuses and ensuring protection of them.  
     The fact that many developing states lack the capacity to effectively secure human rights is 
critical. Outside assistance may constitute the main lifeline for many distressed populations. Yet, 
humanitarians confront formidable problems in security deprived societies. The conditions in the 
great lakes regions of Africa is an example. “Since 1998 deaths in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo alone approach 5.4 million.”
28
  Humanitarians acting to protect and rescue victims 
confront formidable problems in war-torn societies. Belligerents often do not consent to allowing 
the passage and provision of relief. And they generally have no respect for human rights 
conventions and international agreements. They are often unaware of them or are not signatories. 
The dramatic increases in the numbers and kinds of civilian fatalities and human rights abuses 
                                                 
26
 ICISS Report, 57 
27
 Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: War and Conflict in the Modern World 2nd ed., (2012): 9.  
28
 Ibid., 81. 
19 
 
has heightened humanitarian calls for military resources to protect victims and ensure the 
establishment of their rights.
29
 In such circumstances, the most basic task is for aid agencies to 
actually carve out secure spaces in which to operate. Humanitarian agents require safe zones in 
which to operate.  
      Humanitarian intervention as noted here excludes actions against the territorial integrity of 
the target state. It also excludes attempts to restrict the ongoing political independence of any 
state.
30
 The short-range goal of humanitarian intervention is to bring security and to protect 
human lives, not to undermine the sovereignty of the state. The long-range goal is to support, not 
undermine, the rights of communities to make choices regarding political, economic, and cultural 
systems.        
   
Chapter 4: Statism and Cosmopolitanism: The Nature of Duties 
          Advancing humanitarian intervention as a global norm poses a challenge to the current 
structure of the global order.
31
  Nonintervention and restraint regarding the use of military force 
is broadly defended in scholarly essays, and proclaimed in national and international bodies. It is 
the prevailing tradition. Statists, in general, may acknowledge an imperfect obligation of 
benevolence in using non-military power as a diplomatic tool in international relations, but there 
is nothing to indicate they view the duty to protect and rescue victims of human rights abuses as 
a perfect duty. They view the maintenance of order with institutionalized prohibitions against 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 88. 
30
 Aidan Hehir notes in Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, 2nd ed., there is an array of definitions for 
humanitarian intervention, (2013): 21.   
31
 Tom Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy”, J.L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert Keohane, (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, (2003): 53.  
20 
 
interference in the internal affairs of other states as an essential element of international peace 
and stability.   
     In contrast, cosmopolitans are likely to view the moral imperative to respond to human rights 
abuses quite differently. From their perspectives, the violation of the rights of innocent people 
should be the referent object of concern in deliberations regarding humanitarian intervention.  
Cosmopolitans focus upon the universal nature of obligations to humanity. Some cosmopolitans 
advocate humanitarian intervention in a relatively wide range of repressive political situations. 
Authoritarian governments are often viewed as unduly repressive; consequently, they may be 
considered legitimate targets of international intervention. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, 
restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly, and “non-democratic” institutions in 
general, pose challenges regarding the scope of universal human rights, according to 
cosmopolitans.    
     Broadly speaking, we have two contrasting theoretical positions regarding international 
relations.
32
  One way in which these perspectives contrast is their degree of focus on moral 
judgments in international relations. In international relations and foreign policy considerations 
skepticism about the possibility of international moral norms has attained the status of a 
professional orthodoxy in both academic and policy circles as the dominant or default 
paradigm.
33
 Enhancing national security and considerations regarding the global balance of 
power are the primary focus. This orientation represents the “realist” perspective linked to 
statism. Concepts such as global justice and humanitarian goals as ends-in-themselves are not 
realist considerations.   
                                                 
32
 Eric Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, (2009): 15. 
33
 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (1979): 15. 
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      Statism gives priority to specific principles of international relations that generally do not 
give human rights and humanitarian actions much weight. National security and strategic 
advantage should motivate actions. The sovereignty of the state is given greater weight than the 
human rights of its individual inhabitants. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism advances a 
conception of international relations that gives priority to principles of individual human rights 
and “global justice” over state sovereignty. 
     Global justice in the context of this essay and humanitarian intervention is considered as an 
institutionalized retributive commitment to timely addressing humanitarian crises that are largely 
the result of Western colonialism, imperialism, and globalization. For this purpose, we are 
referencing legitimate international expectations that procedures must be developed for, and 
resources committed to, rescuing and protecting people from specific human rights abuses. We 
discuss Western influences in shaping the current global order later.       
     Noninterventionists contend states hold international rights above and beyond human rights. 
Interventionists claim the international rights of states are but a derivation of human rights. More 
will be said about this claim later. On the whole, cosmopolitans accept the principle of 
humanitarian intervention as a legitimate moral imperative. 
34
  
     Although adherents to cosmopolitanism share certain core convictions, there are different 
versions of cosmopolitanism. The same can be said for statism; there is no one perspective 
regarding the relative importance of state sovereignty, human rights, individual or state self-
determination and international moral obligations. However, the perspectives contrast regarding 
the nature of sovereignty. A cosmopolitan perspective acknowledges peoples or individuals as 
the legitimate bearer of rights. A statist views states as the legitimate bearer of rights in the 
                                                 
34
 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 18. 
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international community. The nature and privileges of citizenship differ between these positions. 
Ideally, individuals are viewed as citizens of a universal moral community from a cosmopolitan 
perspective. Statists view individuals as citizens of specific states with rights and privileges 
conferred by the state. Conferring rights, duties, and liberties based upon ethnicity, nationality, 
and other “artificial” categories is fundamentally inappropriate from the perspective of most 
cosmopolitans.
35
 Statists are inclined toward a perspective granting one’s compatriots an 
elevated status, and they are inclined to believe that people are naturally inclined to specific 
allegiances toward their nation, state, and local political forms. Statists are inclined to 
acknowledge and accept moral standards as communitarian, as opposed to universal moral 
standards. In contrasts to individual rights and agency, communitarians emphasize social identity 
based upon membership in specific groups and kinship ties stressing a sense of common purpose 
and tradition. Viewed from this perspective, international intervention could be interpreted seen 
as a strike at the heart of the social identity and established traditions of a community.  
 
Statism 
     Statism is, to a large extent, theoretically constructed on the principle that the rules of 
international relations are derived analogously from domestic society.
36
 In the liberal tradition, 
autonomous citizens in domestic society are viewed as having a right to self-determination and 
freedom from external interference. States are the international analog of individuals in domestic 
society and as such, states have the same rights and privileges in the international arena that 
individuals have in liberal domestic settings. The principle of nonintervention is emphasized as 
                                                 
35
 Uwe Steinhoff, “Against Pogge’s Cosmopolitanism” Ratio, (2013): 340.  
36
 Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War, 17. 
23 
 
just and necessary in order to protect the rights of nation-states. This perspective constrains 
humanitarian intervention.   
     Michael Walzer articulates many of the established principles of contemporary statists.
37
  
From the statist perspective, states are comparatively self-enclosed and states must refrain from 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. The only global community is a community of 
states, not of humanity. Established governments are the legitimate representatives of people in 
international relations. A primary legitimating principle of international politics is self-
determination of states. States have a right to territorial integrity, and within their territorial 
borders they have a right to independence and non-interference regarding their choices about 
political, economic, and cultural systems. This includes the rights of people to establish political 
processes and institutions that may be viewed as morally and structurally untenable from a 
Western perspective.
38
 This is a molecular theory of world politics, in which self-contained 
nation-states are the units of moral and political consideration; states are bound together from 
within and present themselves as a unit from without.
39
 This ideological framework entails 
specific limitations regarding the use of force in international relations. States may legitimately 
wage war only as a response to aggression.
40
 
     Walzer argues that nonintervention and territorial integrity have moral worth because it is 
only within states where people can establish political communities of their own making.
41
  
People should be granted the right to be governed in accordance with their own traditions. States 
                                                 
37
 David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State”, Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, (eds.), Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (2006): 670. 
38
 Ibid., 670. 
39
 Ibid., 671.  
40
 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, 27. 
41
 Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War, 18. 
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have a right to an autonomous process of social development, as individuals have a right to 
independently establish and pursue private ends. Therefore, foreigners are in no position to 
challenge the internal actions and legitimacy of a state’s institutions or actions because they 
simply lack the knowledge and understanding to adequately judge the political “fit” existing 
between the government and the governed in other states.
42
 So long as there is a political 
community whose government fits its traditions and social order, the government must be 
granted legitimacy and sovereign jurisdiction over its citizens. 
43
 Sovereignty is more than just a 
functional principle of international relations. Sovereignty is linked to self-determination, and for 
many states and peoples, it is also a “recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of 
their unique identities and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape and 
determine their own destiny.”
44
  
     Walzer maintains that independence from external military intervention is one of the highest 
goods for states in international relations – if not the highest good.
45
 From this perspective 
nonintervention itself can be viewed as a necessary condition for the enjoyment of human 
rights.
46
 There is a causal connection between the absence of foreign intervention and individual 
liberty. Human rights can only be established, enforced, and observed as the result of a purely 
domestic political process. Furthermore, it is argued, the modern international underpinning for 
this perspective is supported by a conventional interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. 
Charter which states a war is just if, and only if, it is a defensive war.
47
                                             
                                                 
42
 Ibid., 18. 
43
 Ibid., 21. 
44
 ICISS Report, 7 
45
 Ibid., 22. 
46
 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 32. 
47
 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 28 
25 
 
     Debates regarding the legitimacy of military actions (war) constitute “a two thousand year old 
conversation”.
48
 It is with great reluctance that many have acknowledged the position that under 
certain extreme circumstances the use of force is permissible. The Just War Theory (JWT) 
tradition represents an attempt to delineate these circumstances.  The statist arguments regarding 
the legitimate use of force and coercion in the international order are also informed by their 
commitment to and interpretation of JWT. As noninterventionist restraints, the tenets of JWT 
that appear most relevant in guiding and assessing morally appropriate responses to humanitarian 
crisis are jus ad bellum.49 Deliberations regarding humanitarian intervention essentially entail 
deliberations regarding the justice of resorting to war.  
   The principles of Right Intention and Just Cause are tenets of JWT that stipulate the legitimate 
use of force must be motivated by just rather than expedient intentions such as a perceived 
strategic military advantage or economic gain: legitimate statist objectives. Initiating military 
actions for self-defense purposes is a legitimate act based upon the right intention requirement of 
JWT. It is morally acceptable when states act with the intent to defend themselves and halt 
aggression.    
     What are we able to determine regarding the statist view of humanitarian intervention as an 
imperfect duty or a perfect duty? In the face of continuing global atrocities some statists appear 
to acknowledge the existence of an obligation to act but there is no indication they view the 
obligation as a perfect duty. A reformulation of the statist positions regarding human rights 
abuses and state sovereignty is evident. Walzer does state: “faced with the sheer number of 
recent horrors-with massacre and ethnic cleansing” in places such as Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan 
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(Darfur), and the Congo “more military intervention is necessary”.
50
 An emphasis on human 
rights and the need to address significant abuses has gained traction in the international 
community. Yet, a consensus regarding appropriate responses remains elusive.  Walzer 
maintains a general presumption against intervention and strongly suggests that institutionalizing 
humanitarian intervention poses a threat to the stability of the international order.
51
 While there 
may be some degree of convergence of opinions regarding the nature of duties and obligations 
and some acceptance of humanitarian intervention as an appropriate response to extreme human 
rights crises, there are still disagreements over the exact nature of the duty to rescue victims of 
abuse. Do states have a duty to rescue, or do they only have a right to rescue in some cases?  
     Perhaps the position of some statists in the face of extreme human rights abuses is that there is 
a right (not a duty) of humanitarian intervention.
52
 States have a discretionary right to intervene 
on behalf of victims of human rights abuses of the kind mentioned by Walzer. But they do not 
have to exercise that right, if their own citizens would be unduly burdened. If humanitarian 
intervention is viewed as a duty, it is held to be an imperfect duty, like the duties of charity and 
beneficence. There is no perfect or strict moral imperative to protect and rescue victims of mass 
murder and genocide. States may discharge these obligations at their own discretion and in a 
manner of their own choosing. Walzer’s general orientation suggests that the idea “that there is 
no right to be protected against the consequences of domestic failure” still has validity in the 21
st
 
century.
53
 This disposition allows states to avoid relatively moderate burdens to their own 
citizens by not acting even if others are being subjected to severe human rights abuses. Acting in 
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the face of morally determinant humanitarian crises must be judged against national security and 
strategic advantage considerations. In other words, despite the urgency of having human lives 
hanging in the balance, states are still viewed as having the latitude to choose who to help, how 
to help and when to help. This is the essence of an imperfect duty. We may be obligated to aid 
persons in need, but we are not bound to fulfill this duty in any particular way or at any particular 
time. This perspective stands in contrast to the thesis of this essay; humanitarian intervention is a 
perfect duty in that the empirical circumstances surrounding specific human rights abuses 
generally dictate specific moral obligations: what actions must be taken, when they must be 
taken and who must take them to end human rights abuses.  
     If states may discharge duties (or rights) at their own discretion and in a manner of the own 
choosing, then the victims of mass murder, ethnic cleansing and genocide possess no “right of 
humanitarian rescue”. No person or state has a moral claim to be rescued. The general problem 
writes Michael Walzer, “is that intervention, even when it is justified, even when it is necessary 
to prevent terrible crimes – even when it poses no threat to regional or global stability is an 
imperfect duty – a duty that does not belong to any particular agent.”
54
 Somebody ought to 
intervene, but no specific state or society is morally bound to do so. And as we have seen in 
many humanitarian crises, no one acts. The statist orientation appears to reject the idea of 
universal obligations to humanity based upon the principle that human rights impose duties that 
are binding on all people, in all places, at all times.       
     Although an imperfect duty of humanitarian intervention comports easily with the belief that 
states should privilege their strategic interests and the well-being of their own citizens over the 
well-being of foreigners, it can have terrible consequences as we have seen in Rwanda and 
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Darfur.
55
 Human rights and moral obligations are not given priority. This is not the case when it 
comes to the principles of cosmopolitanism.  Although my position is largely in agreement with 
the cosmopolitan perspective, there are some critical differences when it comes to humanitarian 
intervention.     
     
Cosmopolitanism 
     “As a direct challenge” to statism, cosmopolitanism treats individuals instead of states as the 
principal subjects of international order and morality.
56
  My contention that humanitarian 
intervention is a perfect duty appears to be consistent with a cosmopolitan perspective. There is, 
however, a divergence regarding when or under what circumstances humanitarian intervention is 
a moral imperative. To some extent, the difference is linked to the idea of a universal right to 
democracy. We will discuss this later.  
     The rights of states under international law, from the cosmopolitan perspective, are properly 
derived from individual rights. The notion that states have an autonomous moral standing is 
rejected. Governments do not hold international rights that are independent from the rights of 
individuals who populate the state.
57
 The sovereignty of the state is not absolute. Governments 
are obligated to serve human ends. They have instrumental value. In essence, cosmopolitanism 
suggests the distinction between internal and external legitimacy is morally unfounded. The 
internal legitimacy of a government is determined by whether its citizens view its rule and 
authority as valid. The external legitimacy of a government is based upon whether the 
international community in general views its rule and authority as valid. The cosmopolitan 
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conception of universal standards regarding legitimate rule suggests there should be no variation 
between the citizens of states and the international community regarding the question of 
legitimate rule and authority. “State borders and national or ethnic boundaries have no 
fundamental moral significance.”
58
  Borders and most of the arbitrary categorizations that divide 
humanity such as ethnicity and nationality are viewed as being artificial. Foreign states may 
intervene to uphold human rights without denying citizens their right to govern themselves: that 
is, the right to self-determination.
59
 Humanitarian intervention can be supported as a moral 
obligation from this perspective. Cosmopolitanism entails the notion that “every human being 
has a global status as the ultimate unit of moral concern”.
60
     
     Accordingly, Teson argues, from a contemporary cosmopolitan perspective, that humanitarian 
intervention is “morally justified in appropriate cases”.
61
  A major purpose of states and 
governments is to protect and secure human rights, that is, rights that all persons have by virtue 
of their nature as human beings.
62
 A corollary of the argument is that, to the extent that state 
sovereignty has value, it has an instrumental, not an intrinsic, value. Sovereignty serves valuable 
human ends and should be understood as an instrumental value because it derives from a state’s 
responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizens.
63
  We all have the obligation to respect human 
rights by aiding and rescuing victims of human rights abuses, if necessary. Cosmopolitanism 
maintains that external actors have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states to 
support victims of extreme human rights abuse. In addition, it is important to note the 
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perspective of humanitarian intervention advanced by Teson has much broader objectives than 
the humanitarian goals delineated in this essay.  
     As has been noted, I agree with the moral status cosmopolitans assign human rights. The 
state, as an entity with instrumental value, should be bound by the human interest of the 
individuals that populate the state. Human interest should be the priority. At the same time, I 
disagree with the cosmopolitan conception of humanitarian intervention as a means to 
social/political engineering. Military intervention with the goal of establishing a particular form 
of governance in other states is unjustified. Intervening in an attempt to impose or establish 
democratic governance is extremely problematic and divisive. It has an imperial vein that almost 
all developing states will reject. Let us consider the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, for 
example.  
     In “Humanitarian Intervention: Lose Ends” Teson notes humanitarian intervention is 
justifiable as an instrument of “ending severe tyranny” and that “this standard does not 
necessarily require that genocide or a similar massive crime should be afoot”.
64
 The motive of 
rescuing victims of tyranny can justify humanitarian intervention. He finds intervention 
acceptable, for example, when “democratic revolutionaries need help” from a powerful neighbor 
to succeed.
65
 Teson argues that the invasion of Iraq in 2003(Operation Iraqi Freedom) was 
morally justified as humanitarian intervention. “The act of intervention which brought an end to 
a reign of terror is justified for that accomplishment”.
66
 
     In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein indeed had a long history of barbaric human rights 
abuses. Yet, the context of the 2003 invasion must be considered. The U.S. and its allies had 
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been actively involved in actions aimed at restricting the actions of Saddam for years. After the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the U.S. led a United Nations mandated coalition that expelled 
the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991. In an effort to “contain” Saddam’s brutality and punish him 
for violations of international law, the U.S. and the U.K. conducted air strikes against Iraq 
throughout the 1990s.
67
 The containment aspects of this approach were generally effective, yet 
Saddam remained in power despite opposition forces being encouraged to overthrow the tyrant. 
In short, the antagonistic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq continued and grew in intensity 
following the 11
th
 of September, 2001 terrorist attacks. After these events, concerns regarding 
the threat of terrorism naturally played a greater role in U.S. foreign policy considerations. The 
threat of terrorism from failed states and rogue regimes became a growing concern. The calls for 
preventive actions intensified.
68
 These U.S. security considerations were accompanied by 
proclamations regarding the moral imperative of acting to bring Saddam Hussein’s tyranny to an 
end. In short, overthrowing Saddam in Iraq and establishing democratic rule would serve U.S 
foreign policy security objectives and humanitarian ends. The Iraqi political system would be 
reformed and the country would be become a model of democratic governance and liberalism in 
the region. Other Arab states would gravitate toward the establishment of these enlightened 
political institutions. Obviously I have presented a rather oversimplified account of the events. 
Yet the main point is, from the perspective of some cosmopolitans, one of the primary goals of 
humanitarian intervention should be regime change and the establishment of political systems 
modeled after liberal Western states.   
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     This has not worked in Iraq. States are inclined to developed specific social, political and 
legal arrangements based upon their unique histories. Humanitarian intervention must always 
give consideration to the rights to states to develop and establish institutions and practices that 
respect human dignity and the sanctity of life in their own ways. Military force can be employed 
to stop brutal human rights abuses but it cannot be employed to establish political institutions 
that are humane and durable. Humanitarian intervention should address life threatening conflicts. 
“Democratization” should not be the objective.   
     As noted earlier, humanitarian intervention as specified here excludes actions against the 
rights of communities to make choices regarding political, economic, and cultural systems. 
Restricting self-determination and ongoing political processes is not the aim. 
69
 The right to 
choose when it comes to political, economic, and cultural systems must be honored. Armed 
intervention aimed at reforming internal institutions so that they conform to “appropriate” 
principle of governance and justice is not acceptable. I see no moral imperative in supporting 
“reform interventions” aimed at liberalization.
70
 Next, I consider some of my concerns regarding 
reform interventions and the overtly expansive nature of the cosmopolitan push for liberal 
democratic governance.  
 
Cosmopolitan Liberalism and Human Rights     
     Teson notes a regime is tyrannical when its violations of human rights are systematic, “not 
isolated or occasional”. 
71
 He notes war crimes, mass murder, genocide and widespread torture as 
indicators of extreme tyranny. Other specific indicators of freedom (and tyranny) include 
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arbitrary detention and torture, a lack of freedom of speech, an unfair judicial system, and state 
sponsored-kidnappings and murders. In general, “the test” is whether human rights violations are 
sufficiently widespread and pervasive. “There need not be any massive killings, no extermination 
camps, no genocide, no ethnic cleansing”.
72
  
     Teson further states one measure of the appropriateness of military intervention in another 
state will be whether “the intervener helps set up a liberal constitution and secure democratic 
elections”.
73
 Again, I disagree with this perspective of humanitarian intervention. Forms of 
governance that respect human dignity and give priority to the minimal use coercion must be 
allowed to develop within national contexts. They cannot be external orchestrated or imposed. In 
addition, the focus is potentially shifted away from the primary duty to rescue victims of human 
rights abuses. If liberal democracy becomes paramount can we still claim that individuals instead 
of states are the principal subjects of international order and morality? The insistence upon 
liberalism makes the institutionalization of humanitarian intervention even more contentious. 
The prospects for obtaining any degree of consensus regarding rescuing and protecting victims 
of human rights are diminished.    
     The cosmopolitan desire to spread liberalism is, to a large extent based upon, the belief that 
Western “democratic” governance is the most effective way to guarantee the sanctity of human 
rights. Teson states democratic rule “may well be a necessary condition” for enjoying human 
rights.
74
 In like manner, the question is generally posed: “Is there a human right to democracy?” 
It is not my intent to address that question here. I merely contend that injecting the question of 
the value of liberal democratic governance into the humanitarian intervention debate is inclined 
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to side track the focus on acting to protect victims of human rights abuses. Acknowledging that 
tyranny is abhorrent is not problematic. In contrast, attempting to export Western liberalism and 
its legalistic orientation has a divisive imperial tone.  
     In contrast to acquiescing to liberalism as the universal guarantor of human rights Taylor 
notes the true issue is not a specific constitutional arrangement but a consensus regarding 
“certain norms of conduct”.
75
 Institutionalizing respect for human rights from this perspective is 
essentially viewed as an effective application of the doctrine of nonviolence, not as a call for a 
specific form of governmental structure with legalistic frameworks. The determining factor is a 
respect for the dignity of each person which in effect demands a minimal use of coercion in 
human affairs. Taylor references the Asian perspective of social/political organization which 
cautions people against the politics of anger and violence.
76
 The Buddhist injunction to respect 
human dignity comes as a consequence of the fundamental value of nonviolence, not liberal 
constitutional structures. What is important is the fact that outcomes are consistent with the 
moral priority given to human individuals in Western thought. This is an outlook that converges 
with the belief that there is a moral obligation to institutionalize respect for human dignity. Yet, 
it is rather different from the standard cosmopolitan insistence upon the imperatives of 
liberalisms. To be sure, norms of conduct that give priority to human rights are established in 
various ways in different cultural, philosophical and religious traditions.    
     Furthermore, from a global justice perspective, a different angle on democracy has emerged 
in arguments that international institutions themselves need to adopt democratic practices. For 
example, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali contended that it is difficult to endorse democracy 
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within states if the international system is itself undemocratic.”
77
 The undemocratic structure of 
the United Nations Security Council needs reform. The World Bank and The International 
Monetary Fund consistently force repressive economic policies on developing states. 
International corporations operate in developing countries with little regarding for the interests of 
indigenous populations. Democratic input into global governance institutions appears to be 
overlooked by most proponents of spreading democracy. Those who advocate a right to 
democracy should consider the fact that just procedures should be institutionalized within all 
organizations and institutions that are increasingly cross-border or transnational, whether 
regional or global. The primary consideration in these regional and global institutional 
arrangements should be a commitment to establishing a consensus regarding universal norms of 
conduct that respect human dignity, not the global establishment of any particular model of 
governance. The need to devise new forms of transnational representation for the institutions of 
global governance is a critical global justice issue.
78
 Held offers insight into this necessity.   
     Held notes globalization contests the traditional  resolutions of the key questions of 
democratic theory and practice at the state level.
79
 This is a problem for defenders and critics of 
modern democratic systems in a world of regional and global interconnectedness. The very 
process of governance can escape the reach of the nation-state. National communities by no 
means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies for themselves, and governments 
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by no means determine what is right or appropriate exclusively for their own citizens. People in 
the developing world are particularly subject to repressive forces beyond their borders.   
     In addition, from an academic perspective developing world scholars have suggested that the 
colonial-era distinction between civilized and uncivilized states is reproduced in the modern 
distinction between liberal democratic and illiberal undemocratic states. This is viewed as 
providing a disguise for intervention rather than promoting human rights.
80
 There are concerns 
about “the imperial project of remaking the world to suit the most powerful” while marginalizing 
other critical areas of collective decision making that impact conditions that prompt humanitarian 
crises. For the developing world, the idea of democracy has invoked concepts such as self-
determination, permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources, the right to 
development, and the principles of solidarity which calls for the distribution of the costs of 
global challenges in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice.
81
  
Democratization, for many in the developing world, is a term that has imperial overtones, 
signaling the imposition of alien forms of governance that respond to the dictates of global 
financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) rather than local conditions. The idea 
of a human right to democracy implies that there are universal democratic standards that can be 
applied to all national contexts. This is controversial not only because of its links to colonialism, 
but also because of the respect international law traditionally accords to local political, social, 
and religious arrangements.”
82
 Rawls has also articulated the importance of respecting “non-
liberal” societies.  
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     Rawls notes the need to refrain from exercising military, economic and political sanctions in 
order to force other states to change practices and policies we may disagree with. He believes 
there should be consideration given to the fact that there are various ways besides liberalism of 
ordering a society, provided a non-liberal society’s basic institutions meet certain specified 
conditions regarding human dignity and respect for the sanctity of human life.
83
 Given the 
diversity of political and social arrangements throughout the world Rawls’ call for tolerance is 
appropriate and just. This perspective suggests the cosmopolitan tendency to judge other 
societies by how closely their practices and institutions mirror liberal political traditions is 
unjustified. Rawls indicates determining whether or when another state is an appropriate target of 
sanctions is not a task to be taken lightly. Misguided actions to sanction non-liberal states run the 
risk of denying them a due measure of respect and self-determination. Putting unreasonable 
external pressure on other states to democratize is often counterproductive.   Furthermore, liberal 
societies should not hastily determine that other states are unable to reform themselves and 
establish norms of conduct that respect human rights in ways that are consistent with their own 
social, religious and political traditions.
84
  
     Finally, as it relates to the values of liberal democracy and global justice, cosmopolitans are 
inclined to offer another hypothesis that is questionable. Teson states the reason for giving 
prominence to democratic legitimacy and rule is “democracies are more peaceful”. Therefore, a 
rule requiring democratic governance advances support for the cause of human rights and the 
idea of a lasting world peace. “Tyrannies are more aggressive; moreover, the difference in 
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regimes-the coexistence of liberal and illiberal regimes-is a major cause of conflict.”
85
 Real 
world events do not support this contention.  Shue and Rodin cites sources indicating that in the 
1950s and the early 1960s the United States, a “liberal democracy”, used its military power or 
paramilitary power on average of once every eighteen months either to prevent a government 
deemed undesirable from coming to power or to overthrow a revolutionary or reformist 
government considered inimical to America’s interests. The United States’ interventions were 
not preemptive attacks but aggressive preventive wars.
86
 In these preventive actions there were 
no imminent threats. Aggressive military action was often initiated based upon vague 
calculations regarding potentially adverse shifts in the cold-war balance of power.      
     Beyond my objections to the liberal democratic imperative, I oppose aspects of Teson’s 
perspective of humanitarian intervention based upon its consequentialist orientation. His position 
seems to entails ambiguity when it comes to humanitarian intervention and taking actions in 
morally determinant situations. I go into greater detail regarding my objections to 
consequentialism later in the section addressing objections to humanitarian intervention. While 
delineating the case against tyranny and the imperatives of liberal democracy, Teson seems to 
hedge his commitment to the priority of rescuing victims of extreme human rights abuses. 
“There are, unfortunately, no mechanical prescriptions”.
87
 In sum, he advocates a right to 
intervene, not a duty to intervene. The consequentialist considerations, in contrast to the moral 
imperatives, are evident. He states the general principle is that we all have a duty to rescue 
victims of tyranny if we can do so at a “low cost”. “If, on the other hand, the cost rises, the duty 
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turns into permission.”
88
 Teson states we may, but do not have to, rescue victims of tyranny 
when doing so would be costly. The question must be asked, exactly how do those who favor 
cost-benefit approaches make morally authoritative decisions regarding not initiating 
humanitarian intervention to save victims of genocide. Are the costs considerations consistent 
with the consequentialist proclamation that all humans are “morally equal”? In any event, 
humanitarian intervention is not a perfect duty from this cosmopolitan perspective. Essentially, 
from Teson’s perspective the estimated costs of fulfilling a duty can transform that duty into a 
right. I disagree.  
     It appears to me that moral duties are essentially immutable. Granted, there are often very 
good justifications offered for not fulfilling a duty. If that be the case, then the agent should 
acknowledge that she has determined for very good reasons not to fulfill the duty. Perhaps an 
agent might determine that fulfilling a duty involves risks to her safety and welfare that she is not 
willing to take. An agent might have an unfavorable opinion about the people who may benefit 
from her fulfilling an obligation. Nevertheless, an agent cannot, based upon consequentialist 
calculations, decide to turn the duty into a right. Teson acknowledges there is a general duty to 
assist victims of grievous injustice.
89
  But the agent must analyze the costs of intervening. Again, 
the costs analysis, according to Teson, will determine if humanitarian intervention is a duty or a 
right. As I have noted, life-and-death moral obligations carry too much weight to be flipped. The 
agent should let the moral imperative of the obligation stand and simply admit that she has 
determined not to fulfill the obligation.                 
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     Next, we give further consideration to my position which is situated between the non-
interventionist orientation of statism, on the one hand, and the cosmopolitanism mission of 
spreading liberalism, on the other.  
 
Chapter 5: Global Justice and Moral Obligations 
     Moral deliberations regarding acceptable responses to severe human rights abuses require a   
consideration of the concept of duty. Kant offers significant insights into the source and nature of 
moral obligations.
90
 The rational human will is the true source of moral laws and duties. Kant 
contends rational agents are naturally capable of formulating moral laws. These moral laws are 
universal and they are unconditionally binding. The essential nature of universal moral 
obligations rests upon the intrinsic worth of human willing. Rational agency facilitates the 
recognition of universal moral duties. Rational agency has intrinsic value as a moral guide.      
     The supreme standing of rational beings with a capability to legislate universal obligations is 
central to Kantian morality. Their very nature makes them ends-in-themselves. This being the 
case, the only moral obligations that bind all men are essentially those of their own wills. The 
will is “designed by nature to give universal laws”.
91
 Kantian morality stipulates that humanity is 
an end-in-itself and we have a duty to act in a manner consistent with this principle.
92
 The 
principle of humanity as an end-in-itself places a “supreme limiting condition” on the actions of 
every man.
93
 Our rational nature, in framing our individual desires to be treated not as objects or 
means to an end, will recognize this necessity as a universal obligation, or “categorical 
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imperative.”
94
 In a sense, there would be a rational universal convergence regarding the idea of 
the sanctity of humanity and the resulting moral obligations. Rational beings are ends-in-
themselves and cannot be used as means to an end. People cannot be measured or accounted for 
in the same way we determine the value of objects. Morality categorically stipulates that we have 
no basis for measuring the worth of human beings in the same way we may measure the worth or 
cost of objects. I essentially agree with this Kantian perspective regarding humanity as an end-in-
itself.  
     From a deontological perspective the demands of moral obligations often contrast with 
actions that maybe expedient based upon cost-benefit calculations. Consideration of costs versus 
benefits, as we have seen with Teson, will generally determine states have a duty to intervene 
only if the costs are not significant. In sum, it is often determined that a moral obligation to aid 
and rescue victims of human rights abuses is incommensurate with the traditional statist priority 
of maximizing national security, and not overburdening its own citizens.   
   We have noted ethicists divide moral duties into two classes: duties of perfect and of imperfect 
obligation. The duties of perfect obligation are distinguished by virtue of the existence of 
correlative rights.
95
 There is a correlation between perfect and imperfect rights, and perfect and 
imperfect duties. We have perfect rights to our lives; everyone therefore has a duty not to kill us, 
for example. We have similar rights to our bodies, so that no one has a right to use them without 
our consent. The use of force to protect these rights is viewed as morally acceptable.
96
 The JWT 
tradition stipulates using military force to prevent and correct grave injustices is morally 
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acceptable. It is acknowledged that everyone has a right to self-defense. The right to survival is 
universal.  
     When we call anything a person’s right, we in turn acknowledge that a just society ought to 
take measures for securing it on her behalf if needed, and should not leave it to chance, or to her 
own powers. To have a right, as thusly conceived, is to have a claim that a just society is morally 
obligated to defend.
97
 Acknowledging basic human rights as universal clearly leads to support 
for the belief that all members of the international community are at a minimum morally justified 
in using force to protect victims of extreme rights abuses. International standards of conduct for 
states and individuals are detailed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the four 
Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in 
armed conflict; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; and the adoption in 1998 of the statue for the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court.
98
     
     If humanitarian intervention in cases of specific, grievous violations of human rights are a 
perfect duties, then the international community has a moral obligation to seek the 
institutionalization of the practice. Millions of human beings continue to face life threatening 
circumstances as a result of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. The 
experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as interventions 
and non-interventions in a number of other places, are a clear indication that the tools, devices 
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and thinking of international relations need to be comprehensively reassessed, in order to 
safeguard human rights in the 21
st
 century.
99
    
    
Moral Claims Beyond Human Rights 
     In our consideration of human rights we have noted a narrow definition, or special class, of 
human rights that justify humanitarian intervention. There are situations where there is or is 
likely to be mass intentional killing of innocents whom cannot protect themselves. This may 
initially seem problematic but we can address this concern by considering what Churchill 
references as “separability” in identifying moral obligations.
100
 In discussing what distinguishes 
theories of human rights from the justification of human rights Churchill employs the concept of 
“separability” to make the point that legitimate moral obligations go beyond what might be 
considered a human rights. Just because something has not be accepted and defined as a human 
right does not mean that it is not a critical moral concern. The point is that while human rights 
are justified as an indispensable part of our moral lives, they should be regarded as “coextensive” 
with the realm of morality concerning duties and obligations.
101
 “It is a great, but now common, 
mistake to think that, because we see rights as especially important in morality, we must make 
everything especially important in morality into a right”.
102
 A strong conception of human rights 
ought to draw boundary line and show how important elements of compensatory, distributive and 
retributive justice fall outside the proper scope of human rights.
103
 Identifying and establishing 
moral obligations must go beyond human rights considerations. Decisions regarding 
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humanitarian intervention entail the application of ethical principles. Historical developments 
and contextual considerations have relevance. Therefore, narrowing the scope of human rights, 
when considering humanitarian intervention, does not narrow the scope of legitimate moral 
obligations. Employing some of concepts of Shue regarding moral duties and giving 
consideration to the historical aspects of global injustices add weight to the concept of 
humanitarian intervention as a perfect duty.   
     Shue notes a critical distinction among duties beyond the perfect/imperfect distinction.
104
 
“The complete fulfillment of each kind of right involves the performance of multiple kinds of 
duties.”
105
   Shue’s conception serves to expand and delineate critical aspects of moral obligation 
in the international arena. Shue tenders a tripartite typology of duties. He contends for every 
basic rights there are three types of duties all of which must be performed if basic rights are to be 
fully honored.
106
 The three basic duties that correlate with every right are (1) duties to avoid 
depriving, (2) duties to protect from deprivation, and (3) duties to aid the deprived. For every 
person’s human right to physical security, for example, there are three correlative duties. They 
are: (1) duties not to eliminate a person’s security-avoid depriving; (2) duties to protect people 
against deprivation of security by others-protect from deprivation, and (3) duties to provide for 
the security of those unable to provide for their own security-aid/rescue the deprived. With this 
typology in mind, we shall now add some historical context to our analysis in order to delineate 
moral obligations based upon global justice. Shue’s topology should help us in identifying which 
states may have specific obligations and why they may have these obligations. The typology is 
useful in adding context to specific humanitarian crises that will be examined.     
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     Held explains that the global consolidation of the modern international system resulted from 
the expansion of European powers.
107
 Key features of the modern states system such as the 
centralization of political power, the expansion of administrative rule, and the emergence of 
massed armies, became prevalent features of the entire global order. The diffusion of European 
power was accompanied by expanding capitalistic economic structures. “Eventually the 
objectives of war became linked to economic objectives: military endeavor and conquest became 
more directly connected with the pursuit of economic advantage.”
108
 In sum, the global 
expansion of the Western nation-state system became inseparable from the statist focus on 
national security and strategic advantage-including economic gain.     
     The globalization of economic life and national security objectives have not by any means 
been a morally just process affecting each region and country in a similar or equal way. From the 
outset, this process has involved great costs for the autonomy and independence of many. The 
disorganizing effects of Western rule on a large number of small societies and the interlinked 
degradation of the non-European world are well documented. In fact globalization has been 
characterized both by hierarchy, unevenness and injustices. It has been dominated by those 
constellations of economic power concentrated in the West and North.
109
 The social and political 
conditions surrounding mass violence and wars in the developing world are linked to these 
historical developments. Walzer notes the need for a “specification of the context” regarding 
wars and mass violence.
110
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     Western states are directly linked to the circumstances and conditions threatening human 
rights in the developing world. How do we explain repressive governments that foster 
humanitarian crises and mass human rights abuses? Why is the developing world plagued by the 
lack of functioning state governments with authority over their entire territory? “A long history 
of slavery, colonialism, racism, oppression, exploitation, cold war manipulation, militarization, 
conscription, protectionist trade policies, and so on provides important parts of the 
explanation.”
111
 Many developing states do not have the capability and resources required to 
effectively protect lives and maintain public order.   
     Let us now return to the tripartite analogy of Shue and consider how it relates to defining 
moral obligations in the 21
st
 century global order. Even for observers who are only willing to 
consider a very narrow delineation of human rights as substantive, it is virtually impossible to 
ignore the historical circumstances contributing to the inability of governments to uphold their 
duty to protect. Western states have failed in meeting their moral obligation to avoid depriving. 
Likewise, the moral obligation to protect from deprivation has not been met. Humanitarian 
intervention provides a means to fulfill the duty to aid or rescue the deprived. It is an answer to 
the question of what actions are morally appropriate in cases of humanitarian crises. These 
considerations are factors determining the nature of Western obligations. When people take 
actions that are sufficient to bring about an undesirable effect, especially one that there is no 
particular reason to think would have otherwise occurred, it is perfectly normal to consider their 
actions to be a specific cause of the harm. Making attempts to rectify harm is morally justified. 
Colonialism and imperialism clearly involved human rights abuses. They are directly linked to 
most of the life threatening humanitarian crises in the developing world.  
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    Both colonialism and imperialism were forms of conquest that were expected to benefit the 
West economically and strategically. The day to day work of government might be exercised 
indirectly through local assemblies or indigenous rulers who paid tribute, but sovereignty rested 
with the colonizers. The system of colonial domination, which involved some combination of 
slavery, quasi-feudal forced labor, or expropriation of property, is antithetical to the basic 
“Enlightenment principles” of self-government and humanity as an end-in-itself.
112
 Indigenous 
populations were denied autonomy in their ability to make choices regarding core values: 
religion, aesthetics and ethics. Governments wielding political power in the developing world 
were structured in ways that systematically undermined the human dignity of indigenous 
populations. The colonial/imperial system was structured to benefit the Western states and 
transfer resources from the periphery to Western metro-poles.
113
 How are these historical 
realities related to human rights obligations now? What can we conclude regarding specific cases 
of mass murder, ethnic cleansing and genocide in the modern era? The cases of Rwanda and 
Sudan are important in this regard. 
     In 1994 the genocide in Rwanda resulted in the range of 500,000 to 1,000,000 deaths for the 
100 days of bloodshed.
114
 The genocide centered on the two major groups of Rwandans: Hutus 
and Tutsis. There is much to suggest that these ethnic distinctions are contrived “state-enforced 
political identities”.
115
 In 1933 the Belgians introduced ethnic identity cards which essentially 
froze the ethnicity of Rwandans and embedded ethnic differences into the political system. Prior 
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to colonial administration the distinction between the Tutsis and Hutus was not deeply 
embedded.
116
   
     Other factors in the genocide are telling. One of the explanations given for the violence is 
resource scarcity and increased social tensions as groups struggled to survive the economic 
impacts of globalization.
117
  The fact that for at least three years prior to the genocide the 
international community was deeply involved in Rwanda must be considered. The structural 
adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
pressure put upon leaders to “democratize” and the externally brokered Arusha Accords suggests 
to some that international involvement contributed to circumstances that threatened human 
security. In June 1990 the World Bank and the IMF forced Rwanda to implement structural 
economic adjustments which resulted in the currency being devalued by two-thirds.
118
 The 
democratization pressures from the international community caused the governing party to 
legalize opposition parties, and ultimately introduce contentious coalition partners, at the same 
time the government was trying to wage war, manage a collapsing economy, and negotiate with 
hostile insurgents. The peace delegations at Arusha were largely controlled by external parties, 
and represented neither those in charge of the government nor the Rwandan military although the 
Arusha Accords formally ended the civil war.
119
 These factors contributed to the breakdown of 
Rwandan society. Rather than blame the external parties and international financial agencies, the 
Hutu extremists portrayed the Tutsis as the cause of Rwanda’s problems and economic decline. 
The Tutsis were the primary target in the genocide.       
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     The genocide in Sudan must also be considered in terms of the impact of colonialism and its 
lingering effects. The borders of post-independence Sudan owed more to the legacy of the 
British occupation (1899-1956) than to any demographic trends or topography. Establishing 
borders and map-making by colonial powers in Africa has been an ongoing contributor to state 
dysfunction. The north and south regions of Sudan have been in a near perennial state of conflict. 
In 1983 a civil war erupted claiming some 2 million lives.
120
 In the 21
st
 century a systematic 
campaign of ethnic cleansing was pervasive. By mid-2004, based largely upon World Health 
Organization information and other reports, Darfur was described within the UN system and 
Western states as “the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today”.
121
  
     Humanitarian intervention is about aiding the deprived but when we give adequate 
consideration to the global structure of the international order it is clear that the West has not 
avoided depriving, nor have we protected persons from deprivation. Colonial and imperial 
powers have disregarded the human rights of people in the developing world and actively 
fostered deprivation. Can we totally separate these past injustices from the current moral 
imperatives of humanitarian intervention? Some of the past rights violations are directly linked 
to the existence of circumstances that are fostering humanitarian crises. Those deprived have 
legitimate claim to rights in these circumstances. Based upon the standards of morality and 
universal entitlements propagated by fundamental Western moral principles, the developing 
world is owed a duty of justice as a result of the harm that has been done. The deontological 
conception of humanity as an end-in-itself is a central principle. This is the same principle that 
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places “supreme limiting conditions” on the treatment of individuals. The same principle should 
guide us in morally justifying humanitarian intervention.  
     A systematic pattern of behavior on the part of Western states has unequivocally caused harm 
to many developing states. Without these morally improper infringements there is no particular 
reason to think many of these life threatening circumstances would have occurred otherwise. The 
duty to protect and aid/rescue are now moral imperatives. “It is duties to aid that often have the 
highest urgency, because they are often owed to persons who are suffering the consequences of 
failures to fulfill both duties to avoid and duties to protect.”
122
  It seems reasonable to conclude 
that the states that have actively fostered life threatening circumstances now have an obligation 
to make a commitment to addresses the problems. They have an obligation to commit resources 
to an international effort.     
 
Chapter 6: Preemption:A Duty to Protect and Rescue 
     Preemptive humanitarian intervention can play a critical role in the global community 
meeting moral obligations to protect and rescue. It can also address the need to bring 
international norms in line with the demand to protect human rights and halt barbaric human 
rights abuses. States with the capacity have an obligation to ensure that threats to humanity that 
are distant do not become imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become deadly. 
Adequate military power is the most basic aspect of state capacity. If an agent does not have the 
minimum resources required it is not a suitable agent of intervention. Resources are a critical 
factor in determining who must act.  
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     Furthermore, the international community must “act early, decisively and collectively against 
the threats of crimes against humanity”.
123
 Crimes against humanity include mass murder, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. When is preemptive humanitarian intervention morally permissible? It 
appears such actions could have a made a tremendous difference in Rwanda, Darfur, and 
Kosovo.  
     Early actions would have made a great difference in Rwanda. Perhaps 250,000 Rwandans 
were killed in the first two weeks, which equates to a figure of some 17,500 deaths per day.
124
 
Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 
made several requests for reinforcements and permission to act against those planning genocide 
in January 1994, prior to the actual start of the genocide. UN officials refused his request for a 
more robust campaign against those planning genocide.
125
 No other states initiated significant 
preemptive actions at the time. Official observers have agreed that early military intervention – 
within two weeks of the initial violence – by a force of 5,000 could have made a significant 
difference in the level of violence in Rwanda and that there was a window of opportunity for the 
deployment of this force in April 1994.
126
  In the case of Rwanda it is likely that 5,000 troops 
could have averted the slaughter of a half-million people.
127
  
     The case of Darfur is instructive, also. The coverage of the unfolding disaster in Darfur by the 
media, NGOs and UN fact-finding missions in 2003 was such that the violence which followed 
was not unexpected. The human rights abuses were consistently highlighted. By mid-2004 the 
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World Health Organization estimated that between 240 and 440 people were dying every day.
128
 
Again, it is believed an intervening combat force would have had little trouble stopping killings 
by the Janjaweed. A well led-African combat force with Western support would have made it 
possible to stop some of the abuses.
129
    
     Given that Kosovo’s explosive potentiality was so widely discussed, it is morally problematic 
that it did not receive the attention its reputation should have commanded. Finally, by the autumn 
1998 Resolution 1199 was passed empowering the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.
130
 Again, more decisive actions prior to the worst abuses could have saved lives.  
     Considering the worst human tragedies of the past century, what stands out in each case is 
fact that there were warning signs. Violence of such magnitude takes planning and preparation, 
and unfolds within a communal social and political context.
131
 Mass systematic human rights 
abuses require planning, propaganda and the mobilization of substantial human and material 
resources. They require permissive conditions, both domestically and internationally.
132
 “In 
circumstances where the loss of life is imminent the deployment of international military assets 
and armed forces may be able to save lives by stopping the direct killing of civilians and 
allowing for safe zones to be established.”
133
  In morally determinant circumstances the time to 
act is now.   
     Information regarding life threatening conflicts is widely available now. The International 
Crisis Group (ICG) is a new type of NGO dedicated exclusively to monitoring and reporting on 
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areas of the world where conflict appears to be emerging.
134
 Early warning is a critical aspect of 
preemptive humanitarian intervention. “To be an effective component of national security 
strategy preemption requires ‘exquisite intelligence’”.
135
 This is another critical component of 
the state capacity factor. And it has been noted capacity is critical in identifying who must act. 
Having knowledge that human rights catastrophes are brewing and gathering momentum will 
increase the chances of being able to take effective actions to avert them.
136
   
     Preemption as referenced here constitutes a first strike against an enemy who has not yet 
attacked but whose attack is clearly imminent. The argument for preemption presumes a morally 
determinant situation in which there will be no time to react if one waits. Preemption is distinct 
from and more widely accepted than preventive war. Preemption is viewed as justified only 
when there is an overwhelming necessity of self-defense leaving virtually no time for 
deliberation and no latitude regarding the need for a military response.
137
 Danger to life is 
imminent in the sense that it can be made manifest within hours or weeks unless action is taken 
to halt it. Waiting could very well result in a situation in which there is no military option that 
would succeed in reducing or eliminating the threat. Preemptive intervention is also justified 
when military force is necessary in the sense that only military force can accomplish the job.
138
  
     Is it ever the case that an overwhelming necessity of self-defense leaves no time for 
deliberation and no latitude regarding the need for preemptive military responses? In answering 
this question we must consider the reality that mass violence, in general, and wars, in particular, 
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have long “political and moral pre-histories”.
139
 Walzer employs an analogy in explaining how 
military actions may be justified in the fact of imminent threats.
140
 A nation under threat is like 
an individual hunted by an enemy who has announced his intention of killing or injuring him. 
Surely, sure a person would be justified in surprising his hunter, with a preemptive attack, if he is 
able to do so. In sum, there are life threatening circumstances with which no nation or people can 
reasonably be expected to live.          
     Military action can be morally legitimate as an anticipatory measure in response to clear 
evidence of likely large scale killing. Without the possibility of anticipatory action, the 
international community would be placed in the morally untenable position of being required to 
wait until genocide begins, before being able to take action to stop it.
141
 Creating an environment 
of pending mass murder makes an adversary morally liable to military attack.  Planning and 
preparing for mass human rights abuses, especially where there is a historical occurrence of such, 
makes states or other actors morally liable to military attack.
142
     
     Preemption is not controversial in dire circumstance.
143
 The decision to commit atrocities and 
go to war has already been made by the enemy.  Preemption in morally determinant 
circumstances is a self-defensive survival strategy. At times it may be a desperate option of last 
resort prior to receiving an attack that one is absolutely certain is on its way. Self-defense if 
morally justified.   
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     The emerging principles of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are relevant in considering 
preemption and moral obligations.
144
 R2P is not merely a responsibility to react after tragedy has 
occurred. “The responsibility to protect means not just the responsibility to react, but the 
responsibility to prevent…”
145
  Humanitarian  intervention is a morally justified act in fulfilling 
the duty to rescue when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the 
state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator.    
  
Chapter 7: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention  
     We will consider the objections to humanitarian intervention from four perspectives: 
relativism, legalism, consequentialism and realism. I’ll outline the general objections of these 
perspectives then offer a reply.    
 
Relativism: The Problem of Moral Consensus  
     Noninterventionists, from a relativist perspective, are inclined to contend that moral 
deliberations in general, and liberal rights discourse, in particular, represent the efforts of 
hegemonic states inappropriately attempting to extend the sphere of authority of liberal-
democratic values to social contexts in which those values do not hold. The desire of all people 
to shape and determine their own destiny is essential.
146
 Attempting to universalize human rights 
and institutionalize humanitarian intervention is a form of moral imperialism. Humanitarian 
intervention continues a desire to deny the equal worth and dignity of the institutions and 
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practices of people in the developing world. Taking military actions to force Western values on 
other states is morally problematic. The global community must respect the right to self-
determination and be mindful of the fact that local traditions and practices may have intrinsic 
value.  
     In reply to the concerns of relativists, it should be noted that ethical/moral relativism itself is 
theoretically problematic as it lacks coherency when it comes of moral judgments. If relativism 
is true, then the case for humanitarian intervention and universal moral principles in general, 
becomes quite problematic. A defense of humanitarian intervention must reject relativism.
147
 
Furthermore, we should recall how humanitarian intervention was defined earlier. The purpose 
of humanitarian intervention is the deployment of military forces into life threatening conflicts in 
order to protect victims and ensure access to them for humanitarian reasons. Humanitarian 
intervention as noted here is understood to not involve actions against the general social and 
cultural practices of the target state, nor attempts to restrict the ongoing political independence of 
any state. The goal is to address massive human rights violations and prevent widespread human 
suffering.  Acknowledging that those from the outside with a duty to aid must completely 
recognize and respect the sovereignty and traditions of the counties concerned and must attempt 
to find solutions to deadly conflict within the parameters of indigenous institutions is not 
problematic.
148
  
         The moral foundations of current international institutions and conventions do not support 
a relativistic perspective. The claim that one has a legitimate political or cultural tradition that 
supports mass murder and genocide is unfathomable. Mill notes: “One aspect of every system of 
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morals is that they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to human agency 
in particular and society in general.”
149
 Also, we have defined human rights in such a way were it 
should not be impossible to imagine a consensus on this “narrow definition”. And we have 
acknowledged that rights to choices regarding political, economic, and cultural systems must be 
honored. Armed intervention aimed at reforming internal institutions so that they conform to 
Western principles of justice and liberalism is not justified. There is no moral obligation to 
support “reform intervention”. A perfect duty to intervene is only sustainable in cases of morally 
determinant humanitarian crisis. Overthrowing tyranny and institutional reforms are not 
sufficient causes. Domestic political processes and institutions are entitled to enough leeway for 
autonomous resistance and self-determination within limits.           
 
Legalism: Maintaining a Stable Global Order                   
     Legalists emphasize maintaining a stable international order by acting in accordance with 
formally authorized multilateral actions. They demonstrate an unwavering commitment to the 
restraints of JWT and the necessity of United Nations authorized multilateral actions. 
International customs and agreements are paramount from a legalistic perspective.  Humanitarian 
intervention in general and preemptive intervention in particular is viewed as posing risks in a 
world full of perceived potential threats. The risks to the stability of the global order and the 
norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the 
institutionalization humanitarian intervention and preemptive military action. Legalists believe 
permitting humanitarian intervention in too many instances creates a prescription for global 
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instability.
150
 The argument is made that allowing preemptive humanitarian intervention is likely 
to lead to a disastrous proliferation of conflicts around the globe. In addition, aggressive military 
actions are essentially unlawful from an international perspective.
151
 Legalists are also inclined 
to contend that the inherently speculative character of the military action makes it subject to error 
and abuse.
152
 There are continuing fears about a “right to intervene” being formally 
acknowledged.  
     How should we address legalists concerns? Their objection to preemptive war does not 
consider the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making could address the 
problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a state to initiate humanitarian 
intervention.
153
 Institutional checks and balances must be constructed around the practices we 
determine to be morally justified.  
      In considering the stability of the international order, “any event or process that lead to large-
scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines the state as the basic unit of the 
international system is a threat to international security.”
154
 Incorporating humanitarian 
intervention as an acceptable response to international crises is likely to increase global security 
rather than destabilize the global community. In an interdependent world the existence of fragile 
and failed states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations 
can constitute risks to people everywhere.
155
  Again, Rwanda provides an example. The chaos in 
the region after the genocide contributed directly to two civil wars in Zaire in 1996 and 1998-
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2003 that killed more than 3 million people (most by disease) and destabilized the entire great 
lakes region.
156
 Maintaining a non-interventionist posture based upon legal considerations, in 
addition to being morally problematic at times, does not automatically promote a stable global 
order. Furthermore, like the case of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, humanitarian intervention 
can be considered “illegal”, yet at the same time, morally justified. It is quite possible for 
customs and laws to lack sound moral foundations.   
   
 Consequentialism: Outcomes versus Moral Obligations 
     Consequentialists are inclined to make decisions regarding the morality of humanitarian 
intervention with considerations given to costs and outcomes. Focusing upon outcomes, they are 
inclined to question whether the intervening forces have the ability to stay the course and point to 
the fact that anarchical conditions may continue after intervention. Somalia in 1993 – 1994, and 
Haiti 1994 are examples given.
157
 The inadequacy of institution-building efforts after 
interventions is often cited. Humanitarian intervention does not end with the termination of an 
emergency. Consequentialists may ask, why start in the first place when the work will not be 
completed? The consideration of whether the application of military force does more harm than 
good requires applying consequentialist ethics. The real difficulty lies in determining whether 
using the military will help bring about a better outcome than the alternatives.  
     Consequentialists may raise some valid concerns. Yet it appears they offer no significant 
guidance for responding to morally determinant situations. Determining morally appropriate 
responses is quite different from attempting to calculate the likely outcomes of acting, or not 
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acting. Furthermore, there are significant quantitative problems regarding the actual 
measurement of costs and benefits. The question of attaching a value to human life must also be 
considered. We must be mindful of the weight of moral imperatives versus procedural 
considerations.  
     In addition, I am inclined to agree with Rodin’s assessment of consequentialism.
158
 He notes: 
“Consequentialism suffers from debilitating epistemological problems that renders it effectively 
useless as a moral theory of war”.
159
  In general, consequentialist reasoning cannot yield 
substantive conclusions regarding the moral justifications of war.
160
 The Kantian principle of 
humanity as an end-in-itself must be considered. From a deontological perspective the demands 
of duty will often contrast with actions that maybe expedient based upon consequentialist 
calculations. How would a consequentialist perspective give weight to global justice and the 
historical considerations that we have determined are critical to our current moral obligations?   
  
Realism: The Prospects of a Just Global Order 
     Realists are inclined to view the struggle for power and the struggle for survival as identical. 
For this reason they argue that states do not act on the basis of moral concerns, such as human 
rights violations abroad. States are primarily obligated to enhance their own security and 
economic well-being. As a result, realists are inclined to believe the use of the military in 
humanitarian crises is bound to reflect the grand strategies of powerful states.
161
 This perspective 
is evident in some of the criticisms of NATO’s actions. Critics argue that NATO’s intervention 
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was inspired by the desire to proliferate capitalism and project power into Eastern Europe: 
Operation Allied Force was “all about U.S. global hegemony” and not based upon any moral 
imperative to aid the Kosovar Albanians.
162
  
     The realist perspective that the global community is locked in a world order that precludes 
actions based upon moral reasoning does not address legitimate rights claims based upon 
universal human rights and global justice. The realist argument rests solely upon the way the 
world is, as they see it. Furthermore, the realist objections to considering altruistic actions in 
international relations display a lack of concern for the sanctity of humanity. We must give moral 
weight to what ought to be as opposed to a particular perspective focused upon what is. Moral 
deliberations regarding humanitarian intervention as a perfect duty are not utopian. Yet, they 
may require us to intellectually step away from the real. In contrast to the realist perspective, 
Kantian moral principles advise us to seek the true nature of universal moral obligations neither 
in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world.
163
 A conception of humanitarian 
intervention based upon moral obligations assumes that a just social order can in due course be 
achieved. The desired end of a just international order cannot be undermined simply by pointing 
out that it currently does not exist. There is no evidence that it is somehow given in the nature of 
things that people cannot develop institutions and practices capable of halting mass human rights 
abuses.
164
 Establishing universal moral standards and developing a framework for the 
implementation of strategies to address human rights abuses is critical for the global community.     
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Concluding Comments 
 
                Humanitarian crises are morally determinant situations. We must recognize and act 
upon our duty to aid and rescue victims of severe human rights abuses. The global distribution of 
organizational and military capacity makes identifying agents that have the ability to respond to 
humanitarian crises rather unproblematic. This answers the who question. In circumstances where 
defenseless civilians are facing the threat of death from those bent on a brutal campaign of ethnic 
cleansing the question of what particular action must be taken to save innocent lives is not 
problematic: military intervention is generally their only hope. The question of when action must 
be taken is not difficult to answer when the threat of genocide is imminent. Actions must be 
taken immediately. The circumstances will determine we must act, what actions we must take 
and when. Humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty in the face of human rights abuses.   
     Our global community has evolved. The old norms are morally deficient. The statist position 
that in morally determinant situations we have a right to intervene, but not a duty to intervene is 
no longer morally tenable. The cosmopolitan position that we should intervene to promote 
democratic governance has an air of cultural and political imperialism. What has been offered in 
this essay moves us away from the statist past, yet moderates the cosmopolitan push for an 
aggressive spread of liberalism. Circumstances now demand that the international community 
change its basic mindset from a “culture of reaction” to that of a “culture of prevention.”
165
 
Preemptive humanitarian intervention presents itself as a moral necessity we must 
institutionalize.        
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